Reconsidering Rawls: The Rousseauian and Hegelian 
                 Heritage of Justice as Fairness 
                           by      
                       Jeffrey Neil Bercuson 
                A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements 
                   for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
                        Political Science 
                       University of Toronto 
                  © Copyright by Jeffrey Neil Bercuson 2013 
                                                                          
             Reconsidering Rawls: The Rousseauian and Hegelian Heritage of 
                                  Justice as Fairness 
                                    Jeffrey Neil Bercuson 
                                     Doctor of Philosophy 
                                      Political Science 
                                    University of Toronto 
                                          2013 
            Abstract 
            This dissertation is an attempt to better understand the moral and political thought of John Rawls.  
            I begin by calling into question the conventional, though misleading, image of Rawls as a 
            thoroughgoing Kantian.  While the influence of Kant upon Rawls is undeniable and therefore 
            well documented, there are important theoretical differences between them, and these differences 
            open up the necessary interpretive space for the under-appreciated influences of Jean-Jacques 
            Rousseau and G.W.F. Hegel.  That neither Rousseau – a theorist of recognition – nor Hegel – a 
            theorist of reconciliation – is regarded as an important influence on Rawls is a major oversight in 
            the history of political thought – an oversight that my dissertation hopes to amend.  But there is 
            more at stake here than the addition of a new chapter in the history of political philosophy: when 
            we expose the full extent of the Rousseauian and Hegelian heritage of justice as fairness (and 
            later, political liberalism), we get a more complete, nuanced – and, in my view, a more attractive 
            – image of the moral and political philosophy of Rawls.  This new, richer image of Rawls’s 
            political philosophy is captured by what I call “robust reasonableness”: what Rawls offers, in the 
            end, is a more conspicuously demanding account of the reasonable – of our obligations towards 
            our fellow participants in social cooperation.  Justice as fairness is thus anchored by a morality of 
            engaged and committed citizenship.  This is precisely what Rawls sees as missing from Kant’s 
            ethical philosophy.  In response, he turns to Rousseau and to Hegel, both of whom provide, at 
            least on Rawls’s view, persuasive solutions to the pathologies of social and political life.  Rawls 
            incorporates many of these solutions into the normative and practical landscape of his own 
            philosophical doctrine, and this compels us to reconsider that doctrine in the light of these 
            unrecognized influences. 
                                           ii 
                                                                   
                               Acknowledgments 
           I would like to thank the members of my committee, Nancy Bertoldi, Ronald Beiner, Joseph 
           Carens, Simone Chambers and Anthony Laden. 
                                       iii 
                                                          
                           Table of Contents 
           
          	
  
          Introduction	
  ...........................................................................................................................................	
  1	
  
          Chapter	
  1:	
  Beyond	
  Kant	
  ......................................................................................................................	
  9	
  
          Chapter	
  2:	
  The	
  Hegelian	
  Dimensions	
  of	
  Justice	
  as	
  Fairness	
  ................................................	
  33	
  
          Chapter	
  3:	
  The	
  Rousseauian	
  Dimensions	
  of	
  Justice	
  as	
  Fairness	
  ........................................	
  68	
  
          Chapter	
  4:	
  Bringing	
  Robust	
  Reasonableness	
  Into	
  View	
  ........................................................	
  97	
  
          Chapter	
  5:	
  The	
  Width	
  of	
  Public	
  Reason	
  ....................................................................................	
  118	
  
          Conclusion	
  ..........................................................................................................................................	
  146	
  
          Bibliography	
  ......................................................................................................................................	
  158	
  
           
                                 iv