Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007) 12:67–74
              DOI10.1007/s11027-006-9039-4
               ORIGINAL ARTICLE
              Underlying cause of fire: Different form of land tenure
              conflicts in Sumatra
              S. Suyanto
              Received: 26 April 2004 / Accepted: 18 April 2005
              
              C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
              Abstract One of the social phenomena that have arisen in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi
              period (mid-1998) is the increase in land tenure conflicts between local communities and
              tree plantation companies, and between local communities and the forestry department.
              Land tenure conflicts often trigger forest and land fires, which is both a symptom and a
              causeofincreasingconflictovertenureanduserights.Ifthetenureissueisnotappropriately
              addressed, it will continue to result in unwanted fires and forest degradation, related smoke
              and gas emissions, and environmental and economic losses.
                 A recent study in Sumatra revealed that, in many cases, (1) tenure conflicts between
              companies and communities, resulting from past government policies and practices, often
              triggerforestandlandfiresbecauseoffrustrationsbythecommunitiesofbeingunabletohave
              theirclaimsheardinafairandtransparentjudicialsystem;and(2)evenwiththeuseofmilitary
              force, forest policy and management has largely failed to protect forest resources when local
              communities were not involved. The nature of the partnership between communities and
              companies in land use development is also an important factor in influencing the incidence
              and control of fire.
              Keywords Forest and land fire . Land allocation . Sumatra . Tenure conflicts . Use right
              1. Background
              One of the significant underlying causes of the forest and land fire problem in Sumatra is
              fire resulting from conflicts over tenure and use rights (Applegate et al. 2001). If this tenure
              problemisnotaddressed,itwillcontinuetoresultinunwantedfiresinmanypartsofIndonesia
              resulting in negative impacts on the forest environment, the generation of large amounts of
              emissions, and economic losses. For instance, the economic costs of the 1997/98 fires in
              Indonesia have been estimated to exceed US$ 9billion with carbon emissions high enough
              S. Suyanto
              World Agroforestry Centre, Southeast Asia Regional Office, PO Box 161, Bogor 16001, Indonesia
              e-mail: Suyanto@cgiar.org
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      68                      Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007) 12:67–74
      to elevate Indonesia to the position of one of the largest polluters in the world (ADB 1999;
      Barber and Schweithelm 2000).
       Fire is used as a weapon (Tomich et al. 1998). During the ‘Orde Baru’ (new orders)
      period under the Soeharto regime, the policy of land allocation for large companies was
      often determined without acknowledgement of the existence or rights of local people who
      already cultivated that land without security of tenure. Large companies often used military
      powertointimidateandremovepeoplefromtheirland.Fireswereoftenusedtodriveoutthe
      localcommunity.Theperceivedinjusticeoflandallocationmechanismsdecreasedincentives
      for smallholders to control fire from land clearing activities and prevent it from spreading
      to large-scale tree plantations. In most intensive land tenure conflicts, local communities
      frequently burned trees established by large companies. Since the Reformasi period (mid-
      1998),evidenceoflandtenureconflictsbetweenlocalcommunitiesandlargecompanieshas
      increased. Local communities have reclaimed land already planted by large companies.
       Tenure conflicts between local people and the Forestry Department are the result of the
      failure of past forest policies and management, as past forest policies failed to involved
      local communities and often used military force to conserve the forests in state forestland
      (protection forest). This paper documents case studies of the different natures, causes, and
      settings of land tenure conflict in Sumatra as an important underlying cause of fire.
      2. Fire as a weapon in land tenure conflicts between local communities and oil
       palmplantations
      The first study site is Tanah Tumbuh, located on the boundary between Jambi and West
      Sumatraprovinces (Suyanto et al. 2000). It consists of low-lying plains, foothills, and lower
      slopes of a mountainous area. Elevation of this site ranges from 100m to 500m above sea
      level (Figure 1).
       This case study provides an example of tenure conflicts between oil palm plantations and
      smallholders, and how this conflict can lead to increased vegetation burning. The increase
      in land tenure conflict between local communities and tree plantation companies throughout
      Indonesia is one of the social phenomena that have arisen in the post-Reformasi period
      (mid-1998).
       Atthissite,PTTobtained5,000haunderafirstconcessionin1994.Sincefarmersalready
      cultivatedtheland,PTTwasrequiredtocompensatethem.First,thecompanyofferedfarmers
      to become partners under the Nucleus Estate Smallholder (NES) system. The NES system,
      however,wascancelledandreplacedbythePrimeCooperativeCreditforMembers(Koperasi
      Kredit Primer Anggota, or KKPA). Farmers felt that the KKPA system was unfair because
      under that system they had to release 5–6ha of their land to the company. For this, they
      wouldreceiveonly2haofoilpalmplantationandacreditofaround14millionRupiah(US$
      6,478). Farmers also had to sell their palm oil to the company, which would deduct 30% of
      the sale for the repayment of the farmer’s debt. Therefore, few farmers were interested in the
      KKPA.
       PT T then offered to buy farmland for a price of between 150,000 and 200,000 rupiah
      (US$ 69–92) per hectare. Through the village leader, farmers received information that PT
      Tplannedtotakethelandintheconcession area without any compensation if farmers were
      unwilling to sell their land. Hearing that news, some farmers decided to sell, but still, by
      early 1995, only around 700ha of the total 5,000ha had been released. PT T started to clear
      the 700ha of land using slash-and-burn techniques. Farmers suggested that PT T did not
      properly manage the fire, as it escaped and destroyed 100ha of rubber garden belonging to
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               Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007) 12:67–74                                                     69
               Fig. 1 Case studies locations
               farmers. In 1997, during land clearing activities in the second forestland concession, fires
               also spread to the farmers’ gardens, and around 500ha of rubber garden were destroyed.
               Farmers suspected that PT T had deliberately let fires escape into their rubber gardens. PT
               T, however, stated that the fires that caused the damage did not originate in its plantation and
               blamed the farmers’ own land clearing activities.
                   In early 1998, along with the political reformation spirit in Indonesia, farmers in the
               four affected villages demanded compensation for the damage to and loss of rubber trees.
               Moreover, they also claimed back the land from the concession areas and demonstrated
               against the oil palm plantation. Following this show of farmer dissatisfaction, PT T promised
               to give 1ha of oil palm plantation to each farmer in the four villages. When PT T failed
               to fulfil this promise, several demonstrations were held in October 1998 and May 1999.
               Accordingtoourkeyinformantsfromboththecompanyandthecommunities,somefarmers
               tried to burn oil palm trees in May 1999, but the fire failed to spread widely and to kill any oil
               palmtrees. On May29,1999,thevillagers wanted to demonstrate again in the base camp of
               PTT. The company had learned of this plan beforehand and anticipated the demonstration
               by asking the police to handle the situation. The involvement of the police and the use of
               firearmsduringthedemonstrationcausedageneraluproarleadingtoaseriousclashbetween
               the police and farmers. Among other targets, farmers burned down the PT T base camp and
               oil palm tree nursery. Thereafter, PT T stopped all its activities in the area.
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      70                      Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007) 12:67–74
       Thiscaserevealsthatthegovernment’sinequitablelandallocationpolicyforsmallholders
      and large-scale plantation or logging operations often creates tenure conflicts.
      3. Overlapping land tenure and land speculation
      The second case study area is Mesuji in the eastern part of Lampung (Figure 1) (Suyanto,
      et al. 2000). The site, which has a maximum altitude of 50m above sea level, encompasses
      various land use and cover types including swamp forests, tree crop estates, and small-
      holderagriculturallandandtransmigrationareas.Landtenureconflictsamonglocalfarmers,
      transmigration farmers, industrial forest concessionaires, and oil palm plantations were an
      important source of fires in this area in 1997/1998.
       Under the Mesuji traditional adat law, members of the community own swamp forest
      jointly. Eachmemberhastherighttocultivatetheswampforest.Ifaplotwasnotcultivatedin
      twosucceedingsonorperiods,thenbyadat law,someoneelsewasfreetocultivatethatland.
      Whenlandisabundantandthepopulationsmall,shiftingcultivationcanworkefficiently,and
      privatelandrightsissuesseldomarise.Thus,landtenureconflictshadalmostneverhappened
      in the past. At present, however, there is evidence that land conflicts arise when members of
      the community try to keep their rights to land they had previously prepared for cultivation.
      Oncetheyhavecleared swamp forest for sonor cultivation, they maintain rights to cultivate
      this same land for every ensuing sonor period. The effort to hold on to their land rights has
      increased since the establishment of oil palm plantation, transmigration, and spontaneous
      migrant settlement.
       In 1998/1999, many spontaneous migrants came to the Mesuji area. Village leaders and
      chiefs of the local people arranged for land allocation for these spontaneous migrants, fol-
      lowing an official-style transmigration scheme. By paying Rp 300,000 to a village leader or
      chief of local people, a household of spontaneous migrants received 2ha of land. At present,
      spontaneous migrants account for 37% of the households in this area.
       Withtheexpansionofindividual land rights and declining land availability, communities
      at the border of the large-scale plantation have tried to reclaim their customary land from
      the concessionaire. Since 1990, PT S has claimed 5,700ha of land already used by the local
      Talang Gunung people. PT S then prohibited the Talang Gunung from using the land for
      agricultural activities. The Talang Gunung, however, have been holding out in that area and
      they have continued to cultivate the land.
       Around 350ha in this conflict area is swamp land. In 1997, the Talang Gunung and
      transmigrants in Muara Tenang village cleared the swamp area for the cultivation of rice
      under the sonor system. The fire from this land clearing activity spread, and PT S reported
      that it destroyed 2,112ha of albizia and 384ha of acacia. In 1998, PT S asked the Indonesian
      militarytoremovetheTalangGunungfromthatarea.Thiseffort,however,didnotsucceed.In
      fact, the Talang Gunungkidnapped12soldiersandreleasedthemonlyaftertheircommander
      hadapologizedtotheTalangGunung.Sincethattime,PTShasallowedtheTalangGunung
      to cultivate in the conflict area. The company asked, however, that it be informed when they
      wantedtocultivatetheland,sothatPTSmayinspectlandclearingactivitiesandrequestthat
      farmers make a fire break.
       Another case is a tenure conflict between local Menggala people in Desa Labuan Batin,
      who have claimed about 4,000ha of land currently assigned to PT S’s industrial timber
      plantation. In 1997/1998 PT S planted around 1,000ha of acacia in this area. The distance
      between Desa Labuan Batin and the claimed area is about 30km, but the Menggala argued
      they had already used that land before PT S was operating and, according to adat law, they
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